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Artisanal and industrial fishing sectors in Chile require the consolidation of fishery management 
schemes that promote the rationalization of fishing efforts, adjusting them to scarcer fish stocks. 
We argue that a system based on Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) is the best available 
option, especially for the industrial sector. Individual assignments favor the coordination of 
collective solutions to rationalizing fishing efforts, while transferability promotes economically 
efficient solutions to the excessive fishing capacity problem. We propose an initial assignment of 
ITQs based on historical presence, conditioning the ITQ user-rights to annual payments that allow 
financing of the ITQs’ management and enforcement costs. We defend an initial assignment of 
ITQs as transitory user-rights, with a reasonably long period of validity (15-20 years). We argue 
that this favors the political viability of being able to continue perfecting the ITQs system in the 
future. We also propose to empower Artisanal Fishermen Associations, which be able to provide 
reliable proofs of having relevant local representation, with faculties for deciding on and 
administering the distribution and use (among their members) of the total quota assigned to them 
by the fisheries regulator. These self-governing faculties would include the possibility of allowing 
for transferability of individual quota allocations. Finally, we propose that artisanal fishermen have 
the legal ability to carry out transactions with industrial interests, so that some proportion of the 
industrial quota could be caught inside the first five miles (currently being a reserved zone for 
artisanal fishing), for example using artisanal vessels for these purposes. 
                                                 
1 The ideas expressed in this article exclusively represent the personal opinions of the author, therefore in no 
way do they represent the official position of institutions with which the author maintains contractual 
relations. Since the end of the year 2000, the author has participated as an advisor in regulatory matters for the 
Minister of Economics in Chile, including analysis of options for legislative reform in the fishing sector.   2 
1. Introduction 
Extractive fishing sectors in Chile face the need to rationalize the levels of fishing effort that 
brought about their growth during the 1980s and 1990s. Fundamentally, this was growth via 
increments in tonnage caught. Over time this has generated scarcer fish stocks. As a consequence, 
new options for growth in the fishing sector are increasingly related to adding value to the final 
product.  
Since the end of the 1980s a series of attempts have been undertaken to reform the 
regulatory institutions of the fishing sector. In spite of partial advances, the challenge remains in 
terms of consolidating regulations that promote economically efficient allocations of capital and 
labor, and that at the same time are compatible with sustainable catch levels. The legal reform that 
was enacted in January of 2001 is a step in the right direction. It introduced individual catch quotas 
per firm, subject to partial transferability, while being focused on the industrial fleets of the fisheries 
undergoing more significant catch pressures (i.e.. fisheries in ‘full exploitation’
2). The Transitory 
Fisheries Law that resulted from this reform was designed to be a transition instrument, oriented 
towards favoring the construction of longer term consensus, in areas of difficult negotiation.  
This paper discusses the new Fisheries Law that should replace the present transitory 
regulations. We defend the idea that individual transferable quotas (ITQs) constitute the best 
solution for regulating the exploitation of a natural resource that would otherwise remain subject to 
incentives for over exploiting it, even under closed entry for new fishermen and enforcement of 
annual global quotas (total allowable catch, TAC). The fundamental reason for this is that ITQs are 
capable of generating more cost-effective production incentives than other fishery regulations, given 
that ITQs can promote self-regulatory efforts and at the same time generate longer term planning 
horizons.  
We analyze frequent criticisms that have been wielded in Chile with respect to the use of 
ITQs: (i) arguments ‘of principle’ (“No to the privatization of the sea”); (ii) criticisms related to 
inequity effects (quota consolidation and the resulting income distribution, fewer opportunities for 
small/artisanal fisherman); (iii) induced unemployment (unemployment that, according to detractors, 
could be  avoided if ITQs were not used); and (iv) opinions that question the need to introduce 
additional regulatory instruments (“it is sufficient to use the instruments available today in a better 
                                                 
2 Fisheries where annual landings equals or exceeds the ‘surplus productivity (SP)’ of a given species, where 
SP equals the biomass level that exceeds at the least level necessary to maintain the current levels of biomass.   3 
way”, and “the fish will return”).
3  We start by situating the debate historically, then we analyze key 
presumptions that condition the criticisms just mentioned, subsequently we discuss the main areas of 
controversy, and finally we propose solution strategies.  
  
2. Recent legislative reforms 
Since the late 1980s the possibility of implementing ITQs for our main fisheries has been 
under discussion in Chile. Signs of increasing scarcity of our main fish stocks have motivated this 
debate. As part of this process, the Fisheries Law of 1991 introduced the option of using ITQs, 
defined as user-rights with 10-year validity (Peña-Torres, 1996a, 1997). However, lobbying 
pressures during the enactment of this law finally led to ad-hoc restrictions on the scope of use for 
ITQs.
4 As a result of this, and under the rule of the 1991 Fisheries Law, the use of ITQs has been 
restricted to four industrial fisheries
5, none of which represent a significant share in the employment 
or value added generated by the Chilean fishing sector.  
The fisheries crisis of the late 1990s triggered a second legislative initiative attempting to 
expand the use of ITQs. A short-term priority was to allow for the use of ITQs in the horse-
mackerel fishery (Central-Southern zone), which had been severely punished by the  El Niño 
phenomenon of 1997-99. However, this initiative ended up being trapped by successful opposition 
lobbying, led by some private interests linked to industrial fishing of the horse mackerel, with the 
support as well of a heterogeneous group of artisanal fishermen and small industrial fishing firms. 
  
A Transitory Law: Maximum catch limit per boat owner 
For the year 2000 the government decided to promote a transitory law proposal of lesser 
complexity, relative to prior efforts to reform the 1991 Fisheries Law. The resulting law, valid for 
the years 2001-2002, is applicable to all fisheries currently in full exploitation and which at the same 
time are subject to annual TACs. Its main innovations are: 
                                                 
3 For example, see opinions of the fishing businessman Rodrigo Vial, in El Mercurio 10/5/00, “Fishing Law”. 
4 For example, the maximum percentage of fishing that can be administered under ITQs, in a fishery in full 
exploitation, is 50% of the annual TAC, upper bound that is attainable gradually over time: at the soonest, at 
the end of 10 years of annual auctions of ITQs (each of these auctions selling 5% of the corresponding annual 
TAC (Peña-Torres, 1996, 1997).  
5 These four fisheries involve species of high unit value. Two of them are demersal fisheries in the Southern-
Austral zone of Chile (both in state of Infant Development): the Chilean Sea Bass (deepwater) fishery has 
been under ITQs since December 1992, and the Orange Roughy fishery since December 1998. The other two 
correspond to small crustaceans (both in state of Recovery):  the Red Prawn fishery (Regions V to VIII), with   4 
(a) The annual TAC assigned to the industrial fleet is divided into individual fishing quotas (per 
boat owner), defined in tons. These initial allocations prevail only for the years 2001 and 2002; and 
they do not constitute a legal precedent for subsequent years. In the case of demersal fisheries, the 
assignment per boat owner is based on recent catch history (years 1999 and 2000). In pelagic 
fisheries, the allocation criterion gives a 50% weight to the boat owner share in historical catch 
(period 1997-2000) and 50% to the share in the total tonnage (storage capacity) of the whole 
industrial fleet (for the same period).
6 
(b) The direct transferability of individual quotas between boat owners remains excluded. 
Nevertheless, two possibilities of flexibility are implemented: 
i)  Prior to starting each fishing year, independent boat owners can associate among themselves in 
order to consolidate the quotas assigned to the ships under their control; thus they can decide if 
they will undertake fishing efforts with all or only a subset of these ships. The ships not utilized 
retain their fishing authorization, while being exempted from the annual payment of fishing 
licenses, and at the same time receive a prorated participation in the catch records of the ships 
used. This option seeks to promote, on one hand, a more cost-effective use of currently 
oversized fleets and, on the other, to increase the chances of operating under financially viable 
scales of production. 
ii)  In addition, each boat owner can opt to permanently exclude one or more of the ships under his 
control, from fishing activities in a given fishery. In this case, the history (catch and storage 
capacity) of the ship excluded can be transferred to other ships of the same boat owner, or sold 
to another. These transferable records of catch history have a 5 -year validity. The 
transferability of a given boat’s catch history seeks to promote not only the use of more cost-
effective ships, but also that redundant fishing capacity is directed towards other uses.
7 
                                                                                                                                     
ITQs in place since March 1992, and the Yellow Prawn fishery (Regions V to VIII), operating under ITQs 
since December 1997. 
6 The reason for using this mixed criteria in pelagic fisheries is that individual historical catch records have 
been affected in recent years by seasonal closures and other restrictions, and these policies have been 
implemented on the basis of dissimilar criteria per boat owner (e.g. giving preference to catches whose final 
use is for the processing of products for human consumption). In the case of the criterion related to storage 
capacity, the cubic meters of storage under control of each boat owner are corrected by the marine area 
coverage defined in the fishing license that each boat has. 
7 One year after the initiation of this law, this second option has had essentially no use. The reason for this 
arises from a perception of legal precariousness with respect to the rights associated with the transferability of 
a vessel’s catch history, a perception that boat owners link to uncertainty surrounding the future regulations 
that will replace the present transitory law.   5 
(c) Private firms are now in charge of monitoring and certifying each vessel’s landing for 
each fishing trip and accounting it to the corresponding boat owner’s catch quota. Participation in 
this activity is decided by price competition in annual public auctions.  
  (d) Industrial boat owners have now the obligation of accepting observers on board which 
are appointed and financed by the Undersecretary of Fisheries (Subpesca), for the purpose of 
compiling information on their  catch. This same obligation is in effect for the administrators of 
processing plants, with respect to observers monitoring production records and patterns.  
(e) The Fisheries Enforcement Agency (Sernapesca) is endowed with additional 
enforcement powers, for the purpose of improving the effectiveness of control and enforcement.  
(f) Explicit sanctions are introduced for: fishing over the individual quota assigned; unloading 
a catch and not reporting it or certifying it inadequately; discarding at sea species caught; and 
fishing without authorization in areas reserved for artisanal fishing.  
In addition, a series of modifications were introduced with direct benefits for the artisanal 
fishing sector: 
(g) During the validity of the Transitory Law, industrial ships are absolutely prohibited from 
fishing within the first 5 miles (zone reserved for artisanal fishing), from the V
th to the XII
th Regions.  
  (h) Procedures are established so that fishermen and artisanal ships without up-to-date 
inscriptions in the Register of Artisanal Fishing can normalize their situation in fisheries currently in 
full exploitation and under closed access. By means of this ‘controlled opening of access’ an 
attempt is being made to ‘officialize’ a significant proportion of the de facto (informal) activity 
existing in artisanal fishing, and therefore facilitate subsequent improvements in the fishery 
management of artisanal sectors.  
(i) The number of representatives in the National Fisheries Council and in the Zonal 
Fisheries Councils is increased for fishing workers and artisanal fishermen. In the National Council, 
three new representatives are added to the artisanal and labor sectors. These two sectors have now 
7 representatives in total, while the business fishing sector has 4 representatives, there are 4 other 
institutional positions, while 7 remaining members of the National Council are nominated by the 
President (22 members in total). In the Zonal Fisheries Councils (each with 18 members in total), 
the artisanal and labor sectors have now 6 representatives in total (two more than before), while the 
business sector has 4, there are 6 institutional representatives, and 2 representing the university 
sector.    6 
(j) Lastly, for those artisanal fishermen that die while fishing, the conditions for inheriting 
their fishing licenses are made more flexibles.  
  Beyond the present Transitory Law, important areas of controversy remain with respect to 
what a longer-term reform project should address. Prior to the analysis of these controversies, we 
first discuss key presumptions that condition the diagnosis about the nature of the problems faced.  
 
3. Initial clarifications 
(3.1) Uncertainty and cycles of fish abundance: Will the fish return?   
Underlying the differences of opinion observed in the debate over ITQs, diverse private 
interests are at play. In this context, it is true that uncertainties with respect to fish stocks availability 
add complexity to the discussion about fishery management systems. However, there is nothing 
particularly specific to the fishing sector that leads us to conclude that biological-environmental 
uncertainties in fisheries imply qualitative differences in decision making, vis-a-vis the effect of 
uncertainties in other productive sectors; for example, on agricultural production or on investment in 
any another asset subject to financial risk. 
On the other hand, thinking of the present problems in the availability of fish stocks as if 
they were of exclusively cyclical character (e.g. a consequence of the El Niño phenomenon) is 
inadequate. A more complete perspective requires the evaluation of biological as well as economic 
risks associated with the expectations regarding fish stocks’ future abundance. One clear virtue of 
this way of thinking is that it helps to make the differences explicit with respect to: (i) the 
probabilities  assigned to facing situations such as the economic collapse of the fishery, and (ii) 
personal opinions on what is considered a permissible level of risk.  
(3.2) Falls in annual catch levels 
A peculiarity  of fish stocks subject to abundance cycles is that, when mature phases of 
exploitation are reached (i.e. with declining catch productivity per unit of fishing effort), the fish 
growth dynamics can drop off suddenly to a new long-run equilibrium, implying significantly lower 
sustainable catches (Peña-Torres, 1996b).  
In fisheries where cyclical behavior is related to environmental shocks difficult to predict 
(e.g. pelagic fish), it is difficult to discern how much of an eventual fall in catch is due to excessive 
fishing and how much is a result of environmental changes. This type of uncertainty will 
undoubtedly continue to condition fishery management decisions for a long time. Nonetheless, 
decision-making under significant uncertainty is not a problem particular to fisheries. As in other   7 
productive sectors, the analytical response must aim at quantifying relevant risks (e.g.. the 
probability that economic collapse in the fishery could occur) that are associated with the 
biological/environmental uncertainties.  
Today available analytical tools permit the numerical simulation of key uncertainties that 
condition fish stocks abundance. Therefore, reasonable quantification of the risk of fishing collapse 
is within the reach of fishery management. A relevant example is South Africa, where pelagic 
fisheries qualitatively similar to those in Chile are currently managed performing explicit 
quantification of the risk of fishing collapse (Butterworth et al., 1997). Recent efforts in other fishing 
countries (e.g. Namibia)  point in this same direction (McAllister and Kirkwood, 1999). In Chile, 
preliminary efforts have been initiated in the last few years, limited for now to evaluating biological 
risks in the Horse Mackerel and Chilean Hake fisheries (Serra et al., 1999). Further advances in 
this direction should help build consensus on how to choose between different strategies of fishery 
management (Peña-Torres et al., 1999). 
  In Chile, since the middle of the 1980s a trend of increasing scarcity in our main fish stocks 
has been observed. Table 1 shows the case of the pelagic fisheries of the Norte Grande (regions I-
II), considering the aggregate catch of the three main fish species in those regions, and of the 
Central-Southern pelagic fishery (from Regions V to X), in this case considering the horse mackerel 
annual catches (the dominant species in this fishery). 
In the Norte Grande the peak catch was reached in 1986. Fifteen years later, the annual 
catch has fallen to a third of that peak. Northern sardines catch today shows marginal levels, after 
reaching historical maximums in the middle of the 1980s. Although a recovery in the biomass and 
annual catch of the anchovy have partially compensated for sardine losses, the net balance 
(considering the three main species, and after 15 years) is clearly less abundant fish stocks and a 
significant deterioration in the annual catch. 
  In the Central-Southern horse-mackerel fishery the maximum annual catch was reached 
in 1995, after an uninterrupted expansion in regional fishing capacity which was initiated at the 
beginning of the 1980s. However, towards the end of the 1990s a strong drop in catch levels was 
produced, for the year 2000 reaching only a quarter of the peak achieved five years earlier.  
  That the cyclical El Niño phenomenon of 1997-99 has had a strong impact on catch levels 
is undeniable. However, it is just as difficult to refute the thesis that the persistent increase in fishing   8 
effort levels and the resulting catches have also been significant contributors leading to the current 





Catch and Fleet Size in Pelagic Fisheries 
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1975  22.8  37  4.3  581.0  108  17.3 
1980  274.4  47  6.3  1982.9  133  25.3 
1985  870  81  22.5  3160.8  211  52.1 
1990  1983  136  58.6  1639.4  213  58.7 
1995  4089  173  107.4  1891.9  163  49.9 
1999  1267  153  122.8  1147.1  132  46.3 
2000  1065           
Sources: Undersecretary of Fisheries and Sernapesca. 
(1): Artisanal and industrial fleets 
(2): only industrial fleet 
(3): three main species (horse mackerel, sardine and anchovy); artisanal and industrial fleets. 
 
(3.3) Are the regulatory instruments available in the 1991 Fisheries Law enough?   
  There are those that argue that there is no need to expand the legal limits in the Law of 
1991 with respect to the scope of use of ITQs, given that (i) other fishery regulations available 
today are sufficient, or (ii) in the case of accepting the usefulness of using ITQs, it would be enough 
to do so under the limits in effect under the Law of 1991.  
In this respect, our basic premise is that if the limits in the Law of 1991 remain in effect 
with respect to the use of ITQs, fisheries that presently have an oversized fleet will end up sooner 
or later facing a crossroads of: (a) ‘politically capturing’ net subsidies from the rest of the economy, 
                                                 
8 In Chile there is no explicit quantification on the economic concept of over-investment in fishing capacity. 
However, Annex 1 offers an interesting illustration. Column (A) reports the number of industrial ships with 
valid fishing licenses in the different fisheries currently subject to maximum catch limit per boat owner. Column 
(B) indicates the number of ships registered (to March year 2001) by vessel owners to undertake fishing 
operations during the year 2001. The difference between (A) and (B) offers an approximation to the  number of 
redundant vessels per fishery, relative to peak catches achieved in previous years. In July of 2001 a new 
opportunity came up to inscribe vessels to catch the assigned quotas. For example, in the Horse Mackerel 
fishery (Regions V to IX) the number of ships registered by the businessmen was 53 (close to a 1/3 of the total 
available), these 53 ships representing about to 50% of the total storage capacity of the whole industrial fleet 
with valid fishing licenses in this fishery.   9 
as their only option of economic survival in the longer term, or (b) becoming transformed into 
generalized and self-sustaining niches of poverty. Of these two evils, the first epitomizes the epitaph 
that today tends to prevail in what remains of the harvesting fishing industries in more developed 
economies. 
The reasoning of our premise is simple but fundamental. We do not know of any other 
fishery regulatory instrument, other than implementing ITQs, that can achieve a better solution 
(balancing the pros and cons) to the excessive rent dissipation that is associated with over exploiting 
scarce fish stocks under common property. The more traditional instruments of fishery regulation 
(TACs, seasonal closures, or direct controls on fishing technology) have systematically failed to 
avoid fisheries in mature phases of harvesting development from having a similar epitaph to the one 
described above (Bjorndal and Munro, 1998; Scott, 1993; Townsend, 1990). Ineffectiveness in 
limiting global catch has been constant when applying traditional instruments of fishery regulation, 
for both fisheries in development as well as those in a mature phase.  
  In the case of annual TACs, even assuming full  effectiveness in closing entry to new 
participants, strong incentives remain to increasing incumbents’ individual catch, given the objective 
of anticipating a similar strategy from competitors. Empirical confirmation of this result abounds in 
the literature on fisheries economics. 
The Chilean Hake fishery (Regions IV to X) provides additional evidence in this direction. 
This fishery reached its peak catch in the late 1960s (close to 130,000 annual tons), and then faced 
sustained drops in its productivity (arriving at annual catches around 25-30 thousand tons during the 
first half of the 1980s). This brought about the introduction of annual global catch quotas starting in 
1992. Since then, these TACs have been either surpassed or completed in less time than the quota 
period.  
For example, between 1997 and 1999 the annual quota was divided into two periods, 
January-September and October-December. In each one of these 3 years, the quota for the first 
period was exhausted before its term: in 1999 the quota assigned until September was exhausted by 
the middle of July. During 1998, a similar situation occurred with the quota defined for October-
December (Annex 2). In the year 2000, the quota for May-August was exhausted in July. During 
the months from September to December, in spite of monthly quotas being defined, the quota was 
used up in the first few days of each month. 
The premature exhaustion of quotas unmistakably triggers additional pressures to increase 
quota levels, given the economic costs associated with stopping production. In this setting, the   10 
tendency is to expect increases in the incoming quota. A similar reasoning prevails with respect to 
the use of seasonal closures. 
Regarding direct controls on catch technology or fishing gear (e.g.. net size), the history of 
fishery regulations in Chile and worldwide has repeatedly shown that regulated agents will find 
ways of neutralizing these controls, mainly by intensifying the relative use of input not subject to 
control (Munro and Scott, 1985). For example, in the case of limiting the number of fishing days, 
incentives will be generated to make use of greater fishing capacity during permitted seasons. 
  With respect to the argument that it would be enough to use ITQs under the limits indicated 
in the 1991 Fisheries Law, its logic is clearly questionable. This law limits the use of ITQs, in 
fisheries under full exploitation, to a maximum of 50% of the annual TAC. This maximum is 
attainable only gradually: at the soonest, at end of 10 years of annual auctions of ITQs, where each 
auction cannot sell more than 5% of the TAC for that year. The remaining of the TAC that is not 
subject to ITQs remains closed to new entrants; i.e., under the same faulty incentives that we have 
described for catch controls based only on a TAC. 
Therefore, all agents with valid fishing licenses, whether or not they possess ITQs, will have 
incentives to catch the remaining annual quota not affected by ITQs as soon as possible. Hence, we 
should expect exhaustion of the TAC in a shorter time than the quota period; and as result, 
pressures to increase the incoming catch quota. In this scenario, ITQ holders would see eroded their 
incentives to invest in the fish stock, whether it were by way of more conservative harvesting plans, 
or via increases in the added value of the final product. The corollary is evident: to obtain the 
benefits expected from the use of an ITQ system, it is not enough to implement it only ‘partially’. 
Coverage must be 100% of the annual TAC, and ideally subject to a minimum of restrictions on the 
transferability and divisibility of the associated fishing rights. Nevertheless, the economic-technical 
optimums are not always feasible to implement, given prevailing political constraints. Indeed, 
consensus and political equilibrium p lay a preponderant role in negotiating the definitions for 
implementing an ITQ system.  
 
4. Areas of Controversy 
  In what follows we analyze issues that have played a key role in the ITQ controversies 
raging throughout the last decade in Chile. Several of these topics involve aspects of social equity 
(ITQ consolidation and the resulting income distribution; fears of greater unemployment; and future 
prospects for the artisanal sector). Some controversies revolve around the possibility of reassigning   11 
fishery  management power from the government to fishermen’s organizations. Other debates 
depend more directly on aspects related to technologies available and their use (instruments and 
strategies for quota enforcement, problems related to fish discarding at sea). 
  The majority of these controversies depend on finding compromise solutions, conditioned by 
factors specific to each fishery. The use of ITQs is not a free-cost option. However, our argument 
is that ITQs can promote more cost-effective production incentives than those presently in effect, 
because ITQs can promote greater self-regulatory efforts on the part of the private sector, as well 
as foster longer term planning. Both effects are essential to fishing industries that aim at becoming 
self-sustaining in the longer term. 
  First we will analyze controversies where distributive considerations play the key role; then, 
we will consider debates where technological aspects acquire greater relative weight.  
 
(4.1) Initial ITQ Allocation: Auctions or Historical Presence?   
  The implementation of an ITQ system requires initially defining who obtains which fishing 
rights. This creates conflict between potential winners and losers. Some will prefer allocations 
based on historical presence, ideally free of cost. Recent entrants may resent the use of historical 
presence as a criterion for initial assignments, particularly if their ships’ productivity exceeds the 
average in the fishery. In this case they will probably demand recognition of the vessels which 
possess the most productive technologies. Others will emphasize initial allocations that reward catch 
processes which are more labor intensive, arguing that priority should be given to employment 
effects. While others will emphasize that protection be given to communities which are highly 
dependent on fishing. Answering these diverse demands is a complex task that is conditioned by 
political equilibria, given that at the basis of these controversies there are underlying distributive 
consequences.  
In this section we discuss the alternatives of an initial quota allocation based on historical 
presence, or using public auctioning. In the case of the ITQs introduced under the rule of the 1991 
Fisheries Law, these have been assigned using annual public auctions. In the case of the individual 
quotas per boat owner established according to the Transitory Law, assignment has been based on 
historical presence and free of cost.
  9 Combining arguments based on legal principles and on the 
                                                 
9 An important difference between one legal body and the other is that the Transitory Law applies to fisheries 
in ‘full exploitation’ where there already existed significant levels of sunk cost investment. The status of full 
exploitation does not apply to any of the 4 fisheries opened to public bidding under the 1991 Fisheries Law;   12 
equity of the resulting distributive effects, i t is possible to construct arguments in favor of, and 
against, charging for the initial assignment of ITQs. Aggravated by the importance of the distributive 
impacts involved, building consensus in this area is a complex political task. 
With respect to the individual quota assignments for the industrial sector, our proposal is to 
assign them based on historical presence, conditioning these user-rights to annual payment of the 
fishing license, levied for the purpose of financing the direct costs of administering and enforcing the 
ITQ system. This principle of cost-recovery has been the predominant solution in all countries that 
have managed to implement successful ITQ systems (see section 4.8). The costs to be financed 
should include expenses directly associated with the work of the fisheries Regulatory Agency, 
including the cost of applied research necessary for deciding the quota levels, as well as the costs of 
monitoring and enforcing fulfillment of the quota system. 
  The justifications for our proposal are: 
(1)  This solution allows taking advantage of the significant consensus already gained, fruit of 
arduous and difficult negotiations, with respect to the quota shares of individual industrial 
boat owners in the TACs for different fisheries. This doubtless represents the most 
significant political achievement of the various results obtained from the enactment of the 
Transitory Law for the years 2001-2002. 
(2)  Assigning quotas based on historical presence, and charging annual user-fees to recover the 
costs of efficient fishery management, avoids political opposition based on arguments of 
expropriation of rents, whose origins are on sunk-cost investments already undertaken, 
under access rules valid at the time, and whose creation has required cumulative individual 
effort and risk-taking over the years. This argument represents a significant political 
disadvantage for allocation plans based on public bidding of fishing quotas; particularly in 
fisheries where a significant stock of sunk-cost investments already exists. Proposals in 
favor of using public auctioning as the initial assignment scheme for ITQs have in the recent 
past triggered significant political opposition from the fishing industry, and this has 
contributed to the legislative failure of prior attempts to widen the scope of use of ITQs in 
Chile. 
(3)  Considering the effectiveness of the scheme used to assign individual fishing quotas, the use 
of public auctioning in the main industrial fisheries in Chile faces various questions: 
                                                                                                                                     
nor in any of these 4 fisheries does the issue of prior sunk cost investments have a similar level of relevance 
as in most of the fisheries today in ‘full exploitation’.   13 
§  If a priority objective is collecting fiscal revenues for the purpose of financing the costs of 
managing the ITQ system, there is a non-negligible probability that by using public auctions this 
objective will not be achieved. 
The reasons for postulating this spring from, on one hand, that there is already a 
significant degree of industrial concentration in the majority of the relevant industrial fisheries in 
Chile. On the other hand, the dominant incumbent firms usually share a long common history, 
being common participants in various union associations, as well as facing simultaneous 
competition in various markets, in a situation of repeated competition. A probable corollary of 
this set of circumstances is that there are non-negligible chances of collusion between the 
established firms, if auctions are used to assign ITQs. And price collusion is precisely the 
bidding outcome that has tended to predominate in the annual auctions that have been 
conducted in the 4 Chilean fisheries with ITQs assigned according to the Law of 1991. As a 
result, auctioned prices in the majority of these auctions have not exceeded the minimum price 
defined by the fishery regulator
10 (Cerda and Urbina, 2000; Peña-Torres et al., 2002a).  
It is true that among the causes for collusion in these ITQ auctions there are 
imperfections (in principle correctable) in the auctioning method used: 
(i) In each fishery the annual auctions are conducted in a single event without interruption, 
where the price offers of each bidder occur out loud, in sequentially ordered auctions (each for 
a different ITQ %-lot auctioned), and where the bidder offering the highest price wins. This 
auctioning method facilitates mutual monitoring between potential collusive partners; and also 
favors the imposition of reprisals in the following auction phases to those who infringe on a 
collusive agreement.  
(ii) With exception of the first auction process in each fishery,
11 the quantity to be auctioned 
in each round of competition is limited to lots of 1% of the annual TAC. This reduces the 
commercial attraction for new entrants, given the indivisible sunk costs characteristically 
required to starting fishing operations successfully.  
(iii) It is possible to avoid paying the annual fees rising from adjudicated ITQs via auctions, 
without there being any penalty for exercising this option, except the obligation of paying as a 
                                                 
10 The minimum price is defined for the purpose of assuring the recovery of administration and enforcement 
costs in the corresponding fishery. 
11 In the first auction for fisheries in state of ‘Infant Development’ or ‘Under Recovery’, the Government is 
allowed to sell up to 90%-100% of the annual TAC. Auctioned ITQs then lose 10% per year of the initially   14 
minimum the first annual fee.
12 This favors already established firms which can practice ‘price 
wars’ in the auctions, to the detriment of potential new entrants, without this necessarily being 
translated into a greater actual cost for them.
13 
It is possible that correcting imperfections in the present auctioning method could reduce the 
chances of collusive agreement as observed to this point. But even accepting this possibility, 
there are reasons for doubting that the resulting auctioning process would involve significantly 
greater competition between the dominant firms; consequently implying expected auction 
revenues not significantly different from the results obtained to date.  
Here a related q uestion refers to how probable it is that market space exists, or can be 
created, for new competitors with more efficient costs than those of incumbent firms. There are 
reasons to believe that the industrial concentration which is observed in these fisheries is 
probably the result of optimal adjustments (from the point of view of efficiency in production 
costs), given technological and demand features that are relevant in fishing industries (Peña, 
Cerda and Urbina, 2002).
14 In effect, firm’s scale of operation usually constitutes a significant 
factor in achieving competitiveness in these industries. This is a result of prevailing economies 
of scale in varying phases of the fishing business; especially in processing, but also when 
investing in marketing strategies and distribution networks for specific export markets. At the 
basis of these economies of scale there is investment in indivisible sunk-cost assets. It is this 
characteristic which leads one to anticipate significant cost advantages for dominant firms 
already established in a fishery.
15 
§  The prior arguments lead one to think that, even if the auction method were defined in more 
adequate form, it is probable that few (if any) new competitors would be observed, particularly 
                                                                                                                                     
assigned   TAC percentage. These 10%-ITQ lots are then re-auctioned each year (more details in 
Peña-Torres, 1997).  
12 The winning bidder is allowed to pay the auctioned price in 10 equal annuities. 
 
13 In several of the recent ITQ auctions (in the Orange Roughy and Chilean Sea Bass fisheries), the dominant 
incumbent firms have rotated in coordination to present price competition to new competitors, in each 
successive auction of 1% lots. As a result, they have managed to avoid entry of newcomers (Peña-Torres et 
al., 2002a). 
14 The phenomenon of industrial concentration in industrial fisheries is not infrequent at a world level, being 
frequently observed in extractive and processing sectors subject to contractual mechanisms of vertical 
integration. In more general terms, industrial concentration appears as a relatively frequent phenomenon in 
industries that produce and process food, especially in the processing sectors (Scott, 1984; Peña-Torres, 
1996a). 
15 The exception to this proposition could be possible competition from foreign fishing firms. In this case an 
extra dimension of tradeoffs arises between policy objectives. On one hand, the expectation of increasing the   15 
in fisheries where there are already dominant incumbents. This brings up reasonable doubts 
about the effectiveness of using auctions to meet objectives related to favoring newcomers’ 
entry.  
§  With respect to the objective of having the exploitation of fish stocks assigned to the most 
efficient producers: on one hand, the advantage of sunk costs that act in favor of incumbent 
firms represents a justification of economic efficiency for a possible scenario with few or no 
new competitors. On the other hand, if lack of entry of new firms were due to incumbents’ 
collusive strategies causing allocative inefficient entry, the existence of secondary markets 
(such as the leasing of ITQs
16) would help reduce the consequences of the inefficiencies 
initially created.
17 
§  With respect to the objective of assuring ‘adequate rates of exploitation’ for fish stocks: This is 
a challenge in essence related to the process of determination, and consequent enforcement, of 
annual TACs. Therefore, it is not an objective that is directly relevant for evaluating the relative 
efficacy of alternatives for solving the initial ITQ allocation.  
 
 Resolution of conflicts associated with the initial ITQ assignment 
  Controversies over the initial ITQ assignment carry the risk of spilling over into situations of 
institutional blockade, endangering the Government capacity to effectively arbitrate between the 
parties in conflict. It is therefore worthwhile to think about arrangements that help reduce this risk. 
In Chile, an example consists of trying to separate as much as possible the discussion about which 
criteria to use for deciding the initial ITQ allocation (among industrial fishermen), from discussions 
more directly related to harvesting rivalry between artisanal and industrial fleets. 
Recent arrangements in Australia provide another example of interest. To reduce the risk of 
institutional blockade, the task of proposing formulas for the initial ITQ allocation has been 
transferred from the Fisheries Regulatory Agency to panels of independent advisors. These are 
brought together as the need for them arises (i.e. depending on the level of conflict). Their members 
                                                                                                                                     
fiscal revenue generated by auctioning the ITQs; on the other, the possibility of allowing foreign controllers 
to harvest fish stocks within areas that are part of the Chilean EEZ. 
16 In the Red Lobster fishery, with ITQs since April 1992, ITQ lease contracts have represented in different 
years between 20-30% of the annual TAC. In the case of the Chilean Sea Bass fishery, this percentage initially 
fluctuated between 20-35% during 1992-96, and then gradually decreased up to less than 5% of the annual 
TAC (e.g., 2% in 1999). 
17 If these secondary markets were reasonably competitive, the consequences of ITQ assignments based on 
historical presence would therefore be mainly of a distributive nature.   16 
are lawyers, economists and representatives of the fishing sector that do not have any association 
with the private interests in dispute. Their task is to provide advice to the fishing authorities (on 
whose discretion the final decision remains) on the most adequate criteria for initially assigning ITQs 
in the fishery under evaluation. The panel consults extensively with the main private interest groups, 
and then identifies and validates the information sources required for implementing the options 
recommended. Experience accumulated to date shows in general industry support to these panels’ 
recommendations (Kaufmann and Geen, 1998). Arrangements of this type offer the potential of 
leading to less costly litigation, given expected future questioning on the initial ITQ assignments. 
 
(4.2) Fisheries Management and Structures of Governability 
  The previous arguments are related to issues about structures of government for fisheries 
management. Among them, the possibility of transferring part of fishery management powers from 
the government to the fishing industry itself. A trend towards “self-government” today plays a 
central role in the worldwide debate on the future of fisheries management; especially with respect 
to the two main contenders in this debate, ITQs and co-administration (Hatcher and Robinson, 1999; 
Townsend, 1999).
18 
  In countries that already have several fisheries under ITQ systems, over time a gradual 
devolution of management powers has tended to occur towards the regulated agents. For example, 
regarding the funding of biological research and quota enforcement, both tasks are becoming 
increasingly financed by the fishing industry itself. In some countries, e.g. the United Kingdom and 
Holland, more extensive areas of fisheries management have been transferred to the private sector. 
In both countries the government has gradually transferred the management of annual quotas to 
fishermen’s organizations. Today collective  decisions by the relevant fishermen’s organization 
determine how the annual quota they receive is distributed and how it is fished. These organizations 
administer the fishing quotas that the government defines and delivers annually to the member 
fishermen of the organization. These organizations register, organize, and enforce quota transactions 
among members of the organization (Hatcher, 1996a, 1996b; The Economist, 21/11/98: p. 29; and 
Valatin, 1999).
19 
                                                 
18 The term ‘co-administration’ is usually associated with a partial transfer of fishery management powers 
towards the private sector (Pirkenton and Weinstein, 1995; Jentoft and McCay, 1995). Therefore, ‘self-
government’ can also be part of ITQ systems. 
19 The assignment of fishing quotas in the UK to fishermen’s regional associations has the peculiarity of 
being made up of informal agreements between Government and the fishing industry. In effect, the ITQs in   17 
  In Chile, some opponents to the use of ITQs have alluded to the danger that they could end 
up putting excessive discretion in the hands of the fisheries regulator. However, one should expect 
exactly the opposite result. The existence of individual quota holders, where these quotas represent 
rights protected by law, should lead to an effective political force when facing risks of regulatory 
arbitrariness. 
  
(4.3) Transitory or Permanent Fishing Rights?   
  Objectives of allocative efficiency
20 would ideally be met by means of fishing rights that 
have a reliable and prolonged duration, that do not undergo unexpected changes in the rules of the 
game, and that are as freely divisible and transferable as possible. However, considerations related 
to the political viability of reform efforts may counsel accepting restrictions on some of the 
characteristics described above. Our proposal is based on this type of consideration. In order to 
advance to a new phase of reform and improvement with respect to the present system of individual 
fishing quotas, we suggest defining these as transitory rights (like a concession right); perhaps for a 
period of validity between 15-20 years. On one hand, this is a sufficiently long period as to offer 
reasonable stability for production decisions and investment; on the other hand, it offers the option 
that in a future phase of legislative reform, the usefulness of maintaining the transitory nature of 
these rights can be evaluated, or evolved towards a system with more permanent fishing rights.  
  Our central arguments are: 
(1)  This approach offers a transition period that would contribute to proving what beneficial 
effects a system of individual quotas can create ‘in practice’. This offers the option of new spaces 
of transaction in future or compensations that could help to convince agents t hat today are 
opponents to this scheme of fishery management. 
(2)   The transitory nature of the fishing rights provides the fishing authorities with a greater 
margin of maneuverability, in case adjustments are required to the procedures/definitions that 
characterize the system in place. Developing an adequate ITQ system is not a simple task. It is not 
                                                                                                                                     
operation do not possess legal existence per se. In spite of this, a dominant vision prevails that individual 
quota holders do enjoy fishing rights that are clearly defined and defensible in court. At least the banks think 
so, proof of which is that they accept ‘informal’ ITQs as guarantees for loans (Hatcher, 1996; The Economist, 
21/11/98). In the case of Holland, each fisherman is the owner of transferable fishing rights formally and legally 
recognized, and each fisherman can choose whether or not to hand over the administration of his fishing 
rights to a given fishermen’s association. In the UK, each fisherman can also choose whether or not his quota 
is managed by the fisheries regulatory Ministry, or by the corresponding fishermen’s association. 
20 Meaning that economically scarce resources be assigned to those uses where they generate greater value.   18 
only required to overcome political opposition, but there are also complex technical challenges to be 
faced. On one hand, it is reasonable to expect that improvements in the effectiveness of 
enforcement systems will require time of learning and evolution. On the other hand, this demand for 
time and gradual advance also condition the approaching speed to a system of fishing rights with a 
reasonable degree of transferability, and adequate market competition.  
  The evolution of the Icelandic ITQ system is a good example of the results that can finally 
be achieved by advancing gradually. While the first system of individual quotas used in Iceland was 
put in place in 1979 (herring fishery), ITQs only began to be permanent as of 1990, while their 
transferability only became permanent in 1988. Previously, schemes of individual quotas functioned 
subject to restrictions on both dimensions. For example, in the middle of the 1980s ITQs with a one-
year duration were introduced as an emergency measure when facing a period of crisis in an 
important cod fishery (Hannesson, 1997). It was only after the legislative reform that occurred in 
1990 that a uniform system of permanent ITQs with a high degree of transferability, began to take 
effect. Today this system covers more than 90% of the total value of the annual catch in Iceland’s 
EEZ (Arnason, 1997). 
  In the case of New Zealand, the other country where there exists a longer ITQ history and 
where profound advances towards a comprehensive system of fishery management based on ITQs 
have been achieved, the ITQ implementation process was quicker. The first efforts to develop the 
management of some fisheries based on fishing rights took place at the end of the 1970s. But it was 
during 1982-83 when more formal systems of management were initiated, based on transitory 
individual quotas and subject to a partial degree of transferability, for a total of 7-9 marine species. 
Subsequently, a new Fisheries Law enacted in 1986 legislated in favor of a uniform ITQ system, 
with greater coverage of species (21 fisheries were subject to this system), and where the ITQs  
became permanent rights with a high degree of transferability. In recent years, some 40 different 
species have become subject to this uniform ITQ system, which taken together represent around 




                                                 
 
21 The speedier advancement which occurred in New Zealand, regarding the evolution towards permanent 
ITQs with high transferability, was related to the deep market-liberalizing reforms which were initiated in 1984 
and that afterwards continued with growing strength. (see The Economist, December 2
nd, 2000).   19 
Renewal of transitory fishing rights 
Transitory fishing rights carry with them the problem of the uncertainty that they generate 
when the end of their validity is approaching. Finding solutions to this problem requires consensus 
and commitments that presently could turn out to be politically difficult to reach. This task might be 
less complex once the system of individual quotas has already been operating for some time. Then 
more complete information would be available about what should really be expected when using this 
system of fishery management.  
Consequently, an intermediate solution could be to define the re-negotiation of the ‘fishing 
concession’ contract towards the middle of the period for which the ITQs are in effect, for example 
in the 10
th year if ITQs were valid for 20 years. I f the re-negotiation failed in this phase, the 
fisheries authority and the ITQ holders would still have the option of continuing under the conditions 
of the original contract until the end of their term, and then face a new negotiation. But one would 
expect that both parties would have incentives to seek agreement at the ‘midway point’ negotiation. 
The government’s incentive would be the option of an earlier introduction of corrective adjustments, 
while the ITQ holders would in turn attempt to assure greater stability in their planning horizons.  
 
(4.4) ITQs and income inequality  
  Critics of ITQs state that their use will consolidate income inequalities within the fishing 
sector. Regarding this, it is important to clarify some basic points: 
a)  A key benefit of using ITQs is that they offer the potential of creating stronger incentives 
for increasing the level of sustainable incomes in the fishery. One would expect that it 
would be the most efficient producers who would initially take better advantage of the new 
opportunities created. This explains why firms that already operate in a fishery with over-
investment could be willing to pay, once ITQs are implemented, to retire excessive fishing 
capacity, buying ITQs or the ships themselves in order to recycle them towards other uses. 
This also helps one to understand why industrial concentration may increase in a fishery 
under ITQs. Nevertheless, it is equally reasonable to expect that the profits of greater 
efficiency achieved in a first phase of adjustment would end up consequently generating 
beneficial effects for the remaining participants in the fishery. 
b)  There is nothing intrinsically erroneous or unjust in the possible effects described above, 
especially if they are a result of genuine differences in the productive ability of various 
producers. Cost-saving advantages of concentrating production and sales efforts in fewer   20 
hands have a variety of expressions in different economic sectors (e.g. Chandler et al., 
1997). However, in some fisheries the lack of greater productive ability can from time to 
time result from problems associated with situations of poverty, and not so much from 
dissimilar individual efforts, or a healthy (‘just’) market competition. In marine fisheries, 
sector structures are frequently observed that simultaneously accommodate fishermen living 
in poverty, subject to a very low labor mobility, along with firms having modern corporate 
organization and with assets clearly having greater inter-sector mobility. The most relevant 
policy challenges for t he first group are related to problems that spring from living in 
poverty, while policy priorities for the second group are more directly related to adequate 
incentives to promoting aggregate wealth creation. Because of these differences, and given 
the limited labor mobility on the part of the labor force working at the fishing sector, one 
should be cautious when designing the rules of operation for ITQ systems.  
c)  Notwithstanding that, and even when differing opinions prevail about the relevance of 
possible distributive consequences, there are a variety of policy instruments, independent of 
the decision of using ITQs or not, that could be used to counter undesirable distributive 
effects. Therefore, seeking consensus on distributive consequences should not impede 
progress on achieving incentives for rationalization and economic efficiency that are 
associated with the use of ITQs.  
 
(4.5) ITQ Consolidation and Entry Competition  
  Another line of criticism on the use of ITQs states that they will ‘unjustly’ limit the entry of 
new competitors. Regarding this, there are two main concerns. One refers to a possible lack of 
market competition, the other to the opportunities available for small firms and artisanal fishing in 
general. We develop the second issue in the following section. 
  The degree of industrial concentration that prevails in a fishery under ITQs is conditioned 
by the efficient scales of operation for that fishery. Therefore, one should expect ‘quota 
consolidation’ in fisheries where greater horizontal or vertical integration would be produced in any 
case, although perhaps in a longer term. Currently, significant industrial concentration already exists 
in many of the Chilean fisheries for which ITQs are in use today, or where their implementation has 
been subject to discussion. 
  Some examples are: in the southern Chilean Sea Bass fishery, around 10 firms have been 
participating in the annual ITQ auctions since they started in December 1992. In 1997, two of these   21 
firms controlled 70% of the total volume exported. In the  Red Prawn fishery, 10 firms began 
participating in the first ITQ auctions, initiated in March 1992; in 1997, 3 of these firms controlled 
90% of the total volume exported. In the Orange Roughy fishery, 6 firms participated in the first 
ITQ auction (December 1998); in the year 2001, 5 firms controlled a large majority of the annual 
catch. In the Antarctic Whiting fishery, the 2 leading firms in frozen products controlled 87% of the 
volume exported in 1997, while the 4 leaders in freshly-refrigerated products controlled 68% of the 
total exported that year. In the  Horse Mackerel fishery (Central-Southern zone), corporate 
ownership has historically been somewhat less concentrated. In 1995 the 5 main regional fishing 
groups (consolidating jointly owned firms) controlled 55% of the industrial catch in that fishery. 
Nevertheless, due to the crisis undergone by this fishery during 1997-2000, there have occurred 
recent mergers and acquisitions, involving some of the smaller firms in this fishery.  
  It could be argued that observed levels of industrial concentration are probably a result of 
optimal adjustments, from the point of view of the international competitiveness of Chilean industry. 
However, once an ITQ market is created, a small number of dominant ITQ holders could end up 
creating artificial entry barriers for new competitors, for example colluding in avoiding selling the 
ITQs under their control. In this case, not only could social equity objectives be endangered, but also 
allocative efficiency. 
  If there is evidence in the future of a lack of competition in ITQ markets, it will be the task 
of antitrust institutions to study the arguments of the case and, if required, establish the actions 
necessary to correct the problem; for example, obliging dominant firms that have abused their 
market power to sell a portion of their fishing quotas. 
 
(4.6) Opportunities for the Artisanal Sector 
  The individual fishing quotas in use today in Chile are only applicable to  industrial 
vessels.
22 This same restriction h as conditioned recent debates on extending ITQ use to other 
fisheries. On the other hand, artisanal fishermen have privileged access  to zones reserved for 
artisanal fishing, i.e. the first 5 miles from the coast and the interior waters of the country.
23 In 
Chile, harvesting competition for fish stocks shared between artisanal and industrial fleets occurs for 
                                                 
22 Those with more than 18 meters of vessel length and with more than 50 tons. of registered tonnage. 
23 This privileged access is conditioned in the Law of 1991 by the possibility that the fisheries regulator may 
allow for industrial fishing in this zone, in areas where artisan fishing is not carried out or where fishing by 
industrial ships does not interfere with artisanal activity. Therefore, it remains under the regulator’s discretion 
to decide when and how much industrial fishing can occur within the first 5 miles.   22 
only a limited number of fish species (Table 2), although this takes place in the regions with greater 
artisanal fishing employment (Table 3).  
In this  context, ITQ critics have argued over: (a) the danger that the use of ITQs for  
industrial fleets could trigger greater pressures to permit industrial fishing within the zone reserved 
for artisanal fishing; (b) a threat to the survival of the artisanal sector, given predictions of ‘greater 
unemployment induced by the use of ITQs’. 
 
Table 2: Main Fisheries sharing both artisanal and industrial fishing 
Landings (10
3 tons),  
Year 1999 
Artisanal share (%)   
Industrial  Artisanal  1999  2000 
Anchovy, III and IV regions  45.06  16.1  26.4  30.8 
Chilean Sardine and Anchovy, regions V to X 
    (Only region VIII) 
1,341.6  506.5 
(473.5) 
27.4  34.4 
 
Chilean Hake 
*  81.2  22.6   21.8  22.9 
Antarctic Whiting, regions X to XII  15.5  9.1  37.0  58.7 
Source: Fisheries Statistics Yearbook, years 1999 and 2000 (Sernapesca) 
*: Main regions with artisanal fishing: IV (2,730 tons), V (12,320 tons), VII (3,171 tons), and VIII (4,258 tons). 
 
Table 3 
Register of Artisanal Fishermen, year 1999 
(Shows the regions with the greatest number of registered artisanal fishermen) 
 



























II  2,243  17  22  1  0  1 
III  2,279  21  14  2  0  1 
IV  3,997  31  17  27  3  3 
V  5,270  33  32  3  2  2 
VIII  7,825  73  46  14  4  1 
X  16,271  191  215  29  12  9 
XI  2,593  19  13  8  0  1 
XII  3,538  11  12  2  3  1 
country  48,642     426  95  24  23 
Source: Sernapesca (December 1999) 
(*): The number of artisanal fishermen officially registered is smaller than the total actually working in the 
artisanal sector. Of the national total of officially registered artisanal fishermen, 73% are members of some 
fishermen’s organization. 
 
  With respect to the first criticism, since the creation of the reserved area for artisanal 
fishing there have been complaints about fishing in this area by industrial ships. But monitoring   23 
weaknesses have led to a situation where the majority  of these complaints have not been 
substantiated. This regulatory weakness has been eliminated with legislation in operation since 
August 2000, when satellite monitoring was introduced for controlling the position of every fishing 
industrial ship that is operated and registered under the Chilean flag. This reduces the possibility of 
‘non-authorized’ industrial catches in the zone reserved for artisanal fishing.  
Nevertheless, important challenges still remain to be solved: (i) Marking off more clearly the 
discretion that today the fisheries regulator has with respect to when (and how much) to permit 
industrial fishing within the zone reserved for artisanal fishing.
24 One possibility would be to allow 
artisanal fishermen to carrying out transactions with industrial interests, so that some proportion of 
the industrial quota can be caught inside the first 5 miles (e.g. using artisanal vessels for this). (ii) 
Introducing incentives to reduce fish discarding at sea on the part of industrial ships, especially in 
areas neighboring artisanal fishing grounds, given that discarded fish often include species important 
to the artisanal sector.  
  With respect to the possibility of artisanal access to opportunities of exchange offered by a 
ITQ system, it would be advisable that the decision of participating or not, as well as the decision of 
how to administer the collective quotas, remain in the hands of relevant Associations of Artisanal 
Fishermen, i.e. with relevant local representation. Each Association should decide how to distribute 
the annual quota assigned among their members, and which restrictions to impose upon the use and 
transferability of the quotas held by each member. 
  As opposed to the industrial sector where each boat owner could choose between 
administering their ITQs themselves or handing over their management to some fishermen’s 
association (as occurs today in England and Holland), the high dependency on fishing that is 
characteristic of artisanal fishermen’s communities, leads one to think of management schemes for 
artisanal sector’s quotas that be based on representative collective decision-making. 
Nevertheless, problems in organizing efficient collective action in the world of artisanal 
fishing could become important obstacles to applying this principle.
25 Table 3 illustrates a significant 
                                                 
24 The present Transitory Law ‘freezes’ this discretionary power during its two years of validity. 
25 The following doubt conditions any attempt to rationalize the management of artisan fishing, by using ITQs 
or any other instruments of management. Rationalization requires the capability of effectively closing access 
to new entrants into artisanal fishing. However, achieving this faces two significant obstacles: (1) artisanal 
fishing usually constitutes a sector of last resort employment for low skill (and informal) labor force, especially 
during downside cycles in the economy, and (2) in certain fishing areas, it can turn out to be too costly to 
monitor and control artisanal fishing effort.   24 
degree of fragmentation in the legally constituted associations of artisanal fishermen, especially in 
the case of trade unions.
26 
  If associations of artisanal fishermen opt to participate in systems of fishery management 
based on distribution of individual fishing quotas, subject to self-imposed restrictions upon their 
degree of transferability, the opportunity to acquire extra quotas should not be restricted by 
imperfections in the capital market. In Chile there are public funds designed to provide loans, under 
competitive access, to small producers including artisanal fishermen (Corfo funds and associated 
programs such as Fosic and Sercotec). These funds should be used to facilitate the competitive 
access of small fishermen to private financing.  
  With respect to the proposal that ITQs would represent a threat to the survival of the 
artisanal sector, is important to clear up some basic points. First, if the use of ITQs is concentrated 
in the industrial sector, the impact effects on employment should be fundamentally expected in this 
sector. Second, a general perception prevailing in the industrial fishing sector is that a significant 
part of the adjustments required in industrial employment have already occurred (to March 2002). 
Adjustments in this area had already been initiated prior to initiating the system of individual quotas 
per boat owner (February 2001), as a result of the cost pressures triggered by the eruption of the El 
Niño phenomenon during 1997-2000. Third, it is possible that part of the workers displaced from the 
industrial sector might migrate to the artisanal sector, increasing the labor supply in this sector. In 
whatever form this process is resolved, the essential problem remains: there will be reasons to fear 
for the survival of fishing employment, whether artisanal or industrial, every time current 
employment exceeds the sustainable capacity of harvesting fish stocks. And without an efficient 
system of closed access to fisheries, in effect, the previous scenario is inevitable. In this context, the 
introduction of ITQs (or variations thereof) constitutes a way of avoiding future adjustment costs 
that will be even more traumatic. 
  The virtue of introducing individual fishing quotas is that they facilitate the coordination of 
collective solutions to rationalizing fishing efforts. By permitting the transferability o f quotas, 
incentives are generated so that the more efficient fishing businessmen will be willing to pay for the 
retirement of excessive fishing capacity. Thus, the use of ITQs reduces incentives for over-
exploiting fish stocks via over-investment and over-employment. As a consequence, it is possible 
that, in the short term, adjustments in fishing employment will be generated. However, in the longer 
                                                 
26 Of the various types of associations included in Table 3, the trade unions are those where objectives of 
more political content could end up playing a more predominant role.   25 
term the evolution of the sector’s employment is conditioned by the recovery of catch levels, and by 
changes in the structure of production and the intensity of labor use.  
The only option that would allow oversized fishing employment to remain is that labor force 
in the sector success in ‘politically capturing’ net subsidies from the rest of the economy, paid by all 
Chileans. This is the political outcome that is at the basis of the problems currently faced by the 
Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union (e.g. Hatcher and Robinson, 1998). Subsidies from 
the rest of the national economy also account for oversized sectors in the main fisheries in Norway 
(Hannesson, 1996). Accepting this type of result for Chile would imply that the country as a whole 
would  end up bearing costs greater than the benefits acquired by those favored with subsidies. 
Therefore, this political outcome must be avoided.  
  The way to avoid the fishing sector from ending up being transformed into generalized and 
self-sustaining poverty  is having the authorities focused on two priorities. First, there must be 
advance in rationalizing the management of artisanal fishing efforts. This requires consolidating 
policies of effective closed entry to avoid additional fishing capacity entering into fisheries currently 
in full exploitation. It also requires implementing management schemes for the quotas assigned to 
the sector that give preference to strategies of use and control which achieve consensus at the local 
level, for example via collective decisions reached at the pier (‘caleta’) level. 
  Secondly, the authorities should give preference to policies directed at the artisanal sector 
that facilitate a gradual reassignment of part of the labor force today working in over-exploited 
resources, towards other sectors. This requires resisting support requests that imply promoting entry 
of additional fishing capacity into the sector. Reassigning workers with labor abilities having low 
inter-sector flexibility constitutes a complex and difficult challenge. The most frequent answer has 
been to implement re-training programs in order to create new productive abilities. However, 
increasing the chances of success of these programs often requires very costly implementation.
27 




  A frequent criticism to the use of ITQs is that they will increase the discarding of fish of 
lower value, generating a waste of products having positive value.  
                                                 
27 The Economist, 4/06/96: “Training and Jobs. What Works?”, pp. 21-23.   26 
A first basic point is that discarding problems are not specific to the use of ITQs. 
Discarding arise every time that any restriction is effectively enforced (via ITQs or any another 
regulatory instrument) on catch levels and/or minimum size of species with commercial value. 
Discarding will occur every time that: (a) fish stocks are located in multi-species fish patches or 
with a mix of fish of varying size, (b) the fishing technologies utilized are not very selective, and (c) 
when catch levels and/or minimum size of species with commercial value are effectively regulated. 
Under these conditions, discarding will be inevitable. On the other hand, there is no conclusive 
empirical evidence in favor of the thesis that ‘the use of ITQs worsens the discarding problem’ (see 
OECD, 1997; Squires et al., 1996). Moreover, the severity of the discarding problem depends on 
technological characteristics of the harvesting effort, and of relevant demand characteristics.
28 
  Nevertheless, and under any regulatory scheme,  an important objective of the fisheries 
regulator should be to reduce incentives to discarding at sea. In the case of ITQs, there are forms 
of defining the ITQ system that would contribute to reducing the incentives for discarding (Table 4). 
However, the majority of these alternatives imply extra costs in other areas of fishery management.  
 
Table 4 
ITQ features as disincentive to discarding 
Desirable ITQ definitions  Expected Costs: 
1. Monitoring on board.  -  More costly monitoring. 
 
2. Regulating the species-selectivity of the fishing  
    gear. 
-  Could produce undesirable rigidity with  
       respect to the use of efficient technologies. 
 
3. Flexibility in ITQs transferability options: 
-  allow transactions of ITQs defined for 
different species. 
-  regarding ITQs not used up in a given year: 
a)  exchangeable for catch in a future period. 
b)  exchangeable for current excess catch of  
other species under ITQs. 
(*) 
c)  exchangeable for excess catch of another  
fisherman (for the same species). 
 
-  Greater flexibility in transactions: tends  
to increase the costs of enforcing ITQs. 
 
Source: based on Squires et al. (1996) and Turner (1997) 
                                                 
28 Discarding will tend to get worse under a combination of conditions. On the technological side, this will 
occur while there is a greater diversity of species existing in a fishing zone, especially if no clearly dominant 
species exists and the various species live together in nearby areas in high-density schools of fish; and when 
the catch technologies are not very species-specific (Grafton, 1996; Squires et al., 1996; Squires and Kirkley, 
1996; Turner, 1997). On the demand side, discarding will be favored the greater are the price differentials 
between the varying species caught (this is not the case, for example, of the Chilean pelagic reduction 
industry).   27 
(*): ITQs for different species can be valued according to the relative price of each species. Nevertheless, the 
lack of standardization in the quality (attributes) of fish landings implies enforcement challenges with respect 
to which relative prices should be considered for the effects of validating transactions occurring between 
ITQs defined for distinct species.  
 
  Though solutions in this area should be supported by diagnoses specific to each fishery, it is 
possible to anticipate generic actions that would help reduce the magnitude of discarding. For 
example: 
a)  Implementing a scheme of observers on board, with partial coverage of the fleet in operation (to 
give financial viability to the system), prioritizing their use on those users/ships with antecedents 
that indicate presumed discarding, because of direct verification by the observer, or by means of 
presumption based on comparing reported patterns of fishing ‘with’ and ‘without’ an observer 
on board. 
The fishing patterns reported by the observers, regarding average catch levels per net 
casting and their composition (fish size and species mix), could be used to estimate ‘expected 
fishing patterns’, conditioned by the type of ship and fishing gear, fishing ground, and fishing 
season. By comparing these expected fishing patterns with the catch reported by each boat 
owner, reasonable ‘ranges of deviation’ could be defined on which to base the presumed 
occurrence of discarding. 
b)  Presumed discarding justified in this way could trigger a sequential system of punishment. First, 
leading to more extensive monitoring of the fishing activities of the fishermen presumed to 
practice excessive discarding. And then triggering a growing scheme of sanctions, depending on 
the degree of repetition and seriousness of the presumed discarding.  
c)  In the case of regulations on minimum catch-size, it is advisable to evaluate their possible 
substitution by restrictions in terms of permitted fishing zones.  
d)  Regarding other direct regulations on catch, reasonable margins of flexibility should be 
considered for their fulfillment. For example, permitting some excess catch with respect to the 
quotas defined for accompanying fauna.
29 Another option is to define legal flexibility such that it 
allows trading of excess catch over the individual quota. In more general terms, offering legal 
flexibility for complying with the catch regulations, in such a way that those complying with 
them obtain a monetary benefit. 
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(4.8) Enforcement 
  Efficient enforcement is a basic element in order for ITQ systems to achieve improvement 
in fish stocks’ sustainability, and in the economic efficiency of fishing efforts. We have already 
mentioned the challenges associated with discarding. There are also significant challenges related to 
improving the enforcement of catch quotas and landings, and the effectiveness of the sanction 
system.  
In the last decade reforms have been introduced designed to fortify the effectiveness of 
enforcement. First, the Law of 1991 introduced a system of enforcement that increased the 
significance of auditing efforts, based on a dual system of information: reports on landings per 
fishing trip per vessel, and reports of the processing plants on catch use and their suppliers. Second, 
in the year 2000 a system of satellite monitoring began to operate, tracking the location of industrial 
fishing ships operating at high seas. Third, the recent Transitory Law introduced a series of new 
measures to improve the effectiveness of quota enforcement (section 2).  
There is other enforcement areas that are susceptible to improvement. For example, reports 
to the fisheries enforcement agency could be performed via Internet. Or, improving the 
effectiveness of the present judicial process which deals with fishing infractions. Today a substantial 
gap exists between being initially fined for infringing upon a fishery regulation, and being finally 
penalized with the sanctions stipulated by law. 
  On the other  hand, although ITQ implementation probably involves more demanding 
enforcement, ITQ use should at the same time promote greater self-regulation on the part of 
fishermen themselves, as well as providing incentives for making longer term production planning. 
Both effects should provide better incentives for organizing collective action on the part of the 
regulated agents themselves. For example, the private sector could become more involved in 
financing monitoring and enforcement efforts, as well as requirements of applied research. 
Surprising evidence exists on just how powerful these incentives can become, promoting 
private financing for services traditionally perceived as public goods. Table 5 shows examples of 
fisheries in Canada, New Zealand and Iceland, countries where the fishing industry contributes to 
financing a significant proportion of the total costs of managing and enforcing the ITQs in use. In 
Chile, the industrial fishing ships presently pay an annual license, as a lump-sum tax, that is used to a 
                                                                                                                                     
29 The more precise the information available to the regulator on the species composition of catches, the 
smaller the margins of permitted excess catch should be.   29 
significant extent to finance applied studies in fishery management (Peña-Torres, 1997).
30 In the 
case of fisheries managed under ITQs, other costs directly associated with fishery management 
should also be financed by the industry itself. 
When ITQs begin to operate in a fishery, and a dominant vision is shared that they 
constitute rights defended by law, groups of businessmen and/or fishing workers can end up 
cooperating to internalize (i.e., be willing to pay to enjoy) diverse benefits associated with investing 
in assets having the characteristic of  ‘semi-public’ goods, such as applied scientific knowledge or 
enforcement efforts. Conditions that facilitate this type of cooperation at the same time increase the 
chances of success when using ITQs. Examples of favorable conditions are: (a) well defined 
(relevant) limits for the fishery, (b) relatively homogeneous fleets with respect to the fishing 
technologies in use, and (c) adequately enforced fishing rights. 
  Despite the fact that in general we are optimistic faced with the feasibility of 
reasonably efficient enforcement for ITQ schemes in Chile, not we should forget that managing fish 
stocks under ITQs is not a universal panacea. Neither should we think that fishermen will always 
achieve successful collective action in financing enforcement efforts or applied research. High 
enforcement costs, together with disincentives to cooperation and self-control among the fishermen, 
can contribute to reducing the benefits expected from using ITQs. However, in cases w here 
adverse conditions of this type may be present, it is still worth asking if there is some other better 
option for fishery management. 
 
Table 5 
ITQs and Funding of Enforcement and Applied Research Costs 
 
Country  Fishery  Funding of Research (R) and Enforcement (E) costs 
Canada  -  Halibut, British Columbia: 
 
 
-  Sablefish, B. Columbia: 
  100% of E costs: paid by ITQ holders (around US$1 million 
   in 1993) 
 
  100% of (E+R) costs: paid by ITQ holders 
 
New Zealand  -  Total of fisheries under 





  Since October 1994: around 80% of (E+R) costs have been 
  paid by ITQ holders (year 1994-95). 
 
  Before October 1994: a lump sum tax charged in each  
  Fishery under ITQs, without explicitly aiming at recovering 
  the costs of ITQ management and enforcement.  
                                                 
30 The amounts collected in recent years have not been insignificant: between (Chilean pesos) $4,500-$5,000 
million annually. Around 50% of the total collected is targeted to financing applied fisheries research, with a 
dominant focus on biological as well as technological aspects.   30 
 
- Orange Roughy: 
 
  Diverse R costs have been paid by ITQ holders (e.g. around 
   US$ 5 millions during the early 1990s). 
   
Island  -  Total of fisheries under 
    ITQs: 
  ~0.4% of the annual value of TACs is devoted to paying for 
  ITQs management costs. In total, these costs have fluctuated 
  around 1.3% of the annual value of TACs. Payments are  
  made in proportion to ITQ holdings. 
 
Sources: Grafton et al. (1996), Annala (1996), and various other authors in the Conference on ITQs, Seattle-
1994 (Proceedings published as Pititch et al., 1997). 
 
 
5. Final comments 
  We have defended the general thesis, and with special emphasis on the industrial fishing 
sector, that the best way to complete the reform process of regulatory institutions for extractive 
fishing is to implement fishery management schemes based on individual transferable quotas. 
Assigning individual quotas favors achieving success in coordinating collective solutions to 
rationalize fishing efforts, while the transferability of these quotas promotes efficient private 
solutions to the problem of excessive fishing capacity. Thus, public funds can be concentrated on 
supporting the reassignment of the labor force displaced by rationalization efforts.  
With respect to the artisanal fishing sector, we suggest strengthening the effectiveness of 
efforts of association and coordination within the artisanal world as a basic condition to promoting 
management schemes that help to rationalize artisanal fishing efforts. As a fundamental principle 
we propose handing over to artisanal fishing organizations, with relevant local representation, 
powers for: (i) managing the collective quota assigned by the fisheries regulator and (ii) deciding by 
collective agreement if they wish to be incorporated into management schemes based on individual 
quota allocations, subject to rules of assignment, use, and possible transferability under the discretion 
of fishermen’s organizations. With respect to the zone reserved for artisanal fishing, we propose 
allowing transactions between artisanal fishermen and industrial interests, so that it is possible to fish 
some proportion of the industrial quota within this zone, for example using artisanal ships for these 
effects. 
  The essential consequences of the alternatives available today are: either (i) we achieve 
advancement towards a system of fishery management based on individual fishing concessions, 
ideally transferable and subject to efficient entry restrictions and enforcement, promoting through 
this self-sustaining developments in the fishing sector, or (ii) the rest of the national economy will be   31 
faced sooner or later with the obligation of subsidizing the maintenance of productive capacity and 
fishing employment above sustainable catch levels, unless (iii) we are prepared  to accept the 
beginning of the economic death of harvest fisheries in Chile. 
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Annex 1 
Industrial fleets at Chilean fisheries in state of full exploitation: 
Authorized versus Registered (Post February 2001) Vessels 
 
Fishery Units                     (A)  
     Number of vessels with 
     valid fishing licenses 
 
                      (B)  
    Number of vessels registered  
    to undertake fishing operations 
            (to March 2002) 
(1) Sardine and Anchovy 
    (III and IV regions) 
76  4 
(2) Horse Mackerel 
    (III and IV regions) 
118  58 
(3) Horse Mackerel 
    (from V to IX regions) 
** 





53    (=32%) 
 
(64,900) (=49%) 
(4) Horse Mackerel (X region)  196  20 
(5) Chilean Sardine and 
Anchovy (from V to X regions) 
137 and 146  23 
(6) Hoki (or Tail Hake) 
(from V to X regions) 
168  27 
(7) Hoki (or Tail Hake) 
(XI and XII regions) 
20  4 
(8) Austral Pollock (‘3 aletas’ hake)  19  5 
(9) Antarctic Whiting 
(Exterior Northern zone) 
16  5 
(10) Antarctic Whiting 
(Exterior Southern zone) 
14  5 
(11) Gonden King clip 
(Exterior Northern zone) 
17  4 
(12) Gonden King clip 
(Exterior Southern zone) 
14  5 
(13) Chilean Hake  58  20 
(14) Red Prawn (Langostino)  18  8 
(15) Pink Shrimp (Camarón)  38  13 
(16) Yellow Prawn  25     (under full biological closure) 
Source: Undersecretary of Fisheries 
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2000 TAC 4,000 t 4,000 t 4,000 t 3,448 t
Landing
56,000 t 22,000 t
31,200 t 35,352 t
50,000 t 18,000 t
50.000 t 17,500 t
4,000 t
51,009 t 17,057 t
50,499 t 18,033 t
56,441 t 19,601 t
32,336 t 35,687 t